A complex set of factors led up to the tragedy that befell
the community of Lac Megantic, Quebec in July. While we may never know the
exact set of circumstances that led to this terrible tragedy, RWU explores what
appears to be the important precursors, the railroad atmosphere and culture
that appear to be responsible for the wreck. Please read the article here below
and attached.
The
Lac Megantic Runaway Train Disaster
Why
Did it Happen?
In the wake of the
terrible tragedy that beset the small town of Lac Megantic, Quebec on July 6th,
the temptation is to look for a single factor, a single policy, or a single
individual upon which to place the blame. Many in the town will be tempted to
blame the notorious anti-union and lax-on-safety railroad CEO Ed Burkhart.
Meanwhile Burkhart blamed the fire department and is now pointing fingers at
the train’s engineer.
However, those who
study the root causes of disasters like this one generally agree that they are
months, if not years in the making, and are the combined result of a host of
factors. And while any single factor may have been the major catalyst or
trigger, a whole host of precursors more than likely led up to the disaster.
These might well include the actions of Ed Burkhart as well as the engineer, but
also include numerous other factors, such as single employee train operations,
the advent of short lines and spinoffs, the poor safety record on the Montreal,
Maine & Atlantic Railroad, inspection exemptions for unit trains like the
one involved; general maintenance and staffing issues on the MM&A, the
deregulatory environment in Canada in recent years, and more.
And while the ongoing
investigation may take months or even years before the investigation team
reaches a final conclusion, it is safe to speculate that some or all of the
factors listed here all contributed in some fashion to creating a powder keg
that finally exploded in Lac Megantic the night of July 6th, 2013.
Ed Burkhart –
MM&A CEO
MM&A CEO Ed
Burkhart is a renegade in the rail industry. Vehemently anti-union and
dictatorial, Burkhart gained notoriety with his first railroad, The Wisconsin
Central where he was CEO from 1987 to 1999. During his reign there, he
attempted single employee train crew operations, fought numerous union organizing
drives, and had a poor safety record. In 1996, a similar spectacular train
wreck involving hazardous materials occurred in Weyauwega,
Wisconsin, complete with blazing fire balls and the town’s complete evacuation.
After being removed by the WC Board in 1999, “Fast Eddie” went on to purchase
the recently privatized railway in New Zealand, and did the same hatchet job on
safety and staffing there. It would appear that his reckless, irresponsible
behavior has continued at the MM&A. According to one source, “The modus operandi for all of Burkhardt’s adventures in railroading is to
fire as many employees as possible, grind down the wages of the ones who
remain, and maximize the profits for himself and his fellow investors.”
The MM&A Engineer
The engineer who was
in charge of the train, Tom Harding, has more than 30 years experience on the
railroad. Tom tied his train down for the night before departing for the hotel.
What complicity he has in the events that would unfold that fateful night will
be better known after the event recorder is analyzed. But we may never know if
he set the appropriate number of handbrakes, as there is no software record of
this activity and the cars that would have been hand-braked were at the head of
the train, and these cars were completely destroyed in the inferno.
Unit Train
Maintenance
Through special
waivers, some unit trains that stay together as a “unit” and circulate from
mine to mill or in this case from oil fill-up to oil load-out and back again in
a cycle, are exempt from the scrutiny that other trains receive. It is possible
that the brake shoes on the cars of the train were worn beyond a safe level,
and/or the brake seals and gaskets were worn and subject to above average
leakage of compressed air. A few carmen we’ve discussed this incident with
raised questions about the train’s air brakes bleeding off in such a short time
period after the engine was shut down. Potentially some of this might come out
in the future investigation.
The MM&A Safety
Record and Safety Culture
The accident has
shined a spotlight on MMA's safety record. Over the past decade, the company
has consistently recorded a much higher accident rate than the national average
in the U.S., according to data from the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA).
Last year, for
instance, the railroad had 36.1 accidents per million miles traveled by its
trains. The national average for 2012 was 14.6.
These statistics
point to a railroad that is lax on safety as a matter of policy. So this
outlook could easily have contributed to any failure on the part of the
engineer to strictly follow the rules, knowing perhaps that the company
tolerated or even encouraged “short cuts” to save time and money. It
potentially contributed to a failure to: 1-- properly inspect the train at its
initial terminal as well; and/or 2 -- properly inspect/repair the locomotive
that was badly leaking oil upon arrival at the end of its run (which resulted
in the locomotive fire); and/or 3 – take action when informed by the engineer
that the locomotive had a serious oil leak which could have prevented the fire
and eventual locomotive shut down around midnight.
Canadian Government
Lack of Oversight and Regulation
According to the
United Steelworkers of America (USW), the union that represents 75 employees at
MM&A in Canada, in recent times, the government of Canada has taken a
“laissez –fair” approach to transport operations. “Over the years, the
federal government has deregulated rail transport as well as the aviation
industry” said Daniel Roy, United Steelworkers’ Quebec Director.
In fact, by the time the Mulroney government was finished with its reforms,
the rail industry was deregulated, and companies had rewritten the safety
rules. That launched an era of cost-cutting, massive lay-offs, and speed-ups on
the job, and eventually, the full privatization of companies and rail-lines.
The subsequent Liberal government completed the job by turning over what regulation
remained to rail companies themselves. A report issued in 2007 by a safety
group spelled out the result: Canada's rail system was a disaster in the
waiting.
The rail carriers have been using old rail cars to ship the new Bakken oil,
despite the fact that regulators warned the federal government they were
unsafe, as far back as 20 years ago. A more recent report by a federal agency
reminded the government that the cars could be "subject to damage and
catastrophic loss of hazardous materials." All of these warnings have been
ignored.
Short Lines and
Spinoffs
The rail line in
question operated by the MM&A was previously owned by the Canadian Pacific
in the late 1990s. The sale by the CP was part of the arrival of the so-called
“short lines” in Canada, some of which consist of rail operations that were
abandoned by large rail corporations. These “spin-offs” greatly benefitted the
large railroads who were now able to shed the responsibility of operating less
profitable lines while in many cases continuing to receive the more
lucrative “long haul”, since the short line delivers its loaded rail cars
to the big railroad for forwarding.
These short lines do
not have the resources and are not subject to scrutiny the way larger railroads
like CP and CN are. Because short lines are often lightly used, the track,
locomotives and other equipment are is often not maintained to a
level that is maintained by the larger, richer railroads.
Single Employee Train
Crews
The MM&A had
convinced the federal government in 2012 that it could safely handle trains
with a single employee. Transport Canada gave the railroad the green light in
late 2012 to reduce staffing aboard road trains. (Apparently the carrier had
previously been running trains with a single employee south of the border).
Common sense dictates that two heads are better than one, that two sets of eyes
and ears see and hear more, and that two fatigued employees at the end of a
long day in the middle of the night will remember and respond better than just one.
It is debatable to just what extent the single employee crew role played in the
wreck, but it is safe to say that in all likelihood, a traditional crew of both
engineer and conductor would have performed the securement of the train in a
more efficient and safe manner.
Securing Trains on A
Steep Grade
Just west of where
the train was left standing is apparently relatively level terrain. Had the
train broke free and ran away here, it would have almost certainly have caused
no damage whatsoever and rolled to a stop at a slow speed. Why then was it
standard practice to leave an extremely heavy and dangerous loaded oil train at
the top of a steep grade when it was not necessary to do so? Did the company
stand to save money on cab ride or other fees? Whatever the case, there is no
excuse for regularly leaving a train unattended on such a steep grade. Railroad
property is almost universally easily accessible to pedestrians, and on a
Saturday night, it is feasible that young revelers could knock off the train’s
hand and/or air brakes, setting it free to roll.
Conclusion
While it can be
endlessly debated which of the above factors played a “key role” or a “major”
or “minor” role in the train wreck, what we can plainly see is a disturbing pattern
by which rail corporations, oil companies, big business and their political
allies have all combined to create an irresponsible and unsafe situation where
corporate profits are placed well ahead of public and worker safety.
Deregulation, lax oversight, short staffing, inadequate legally mandated rest,
reductions in train crew size, poor maintenance, corner cutting and more are
the root causes that ultimately result in train wrecks. Unless and until
this trend is halted and reversed, we are bound to see more cataclysmic train
wrecks of this nature. We simply cannot trust the safety of the public and the
safety of railroad workers to the rail corporations, big or small, in Canada or
the U.S.
